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In this paper, I assess the determinants and validity of citizens’ perceptions of 
election quality. First, I suggest that citizens’ evaluation of the performance of 
election-related institutions is the most crucial determinant of their election quality 
perceptions; however, citizens’ personal experience with electoral irregularities, 
and affiliation with electoral winners also matter. Second, I argue that citizens’ 
election quality perceptions are generally indicative of prevailing trends within 
different stages of the election process. I expect citizens’ perceptions to be 
correlated with other non-perception-based indicators of election quality. I test 
these hypotheses in the context of the 2007 Nigerian elections, using survey data 
from the Afrobarometer and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems 
along with original data coded from petitions filed in Nigerian Election Tribunals. 
The findings provide robust support for the hypotheses and underscore the 
importance of gauging citizens’ perceptions of electoral quality. Most importantly, 
the results indicate that Nigerians were critical of the quality of the 2007 elections 
and demand electoral institutions with impartiality and professionalism.  
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 A version of this paper has also been published in the Afrobarometer Working Paper Series as 




Popular confidence in the conduct of elections is important for the consolidation 
of democracies. When citizens perceive elections as free and fair they are more 
satisfied with democracy (Bratton et al 2005), more supportive of the ruling 
government, and more likely to accept the defeat of favored candidates 
(Moehler 2009).   
 
Despite the importance of popular evaluations of election quality, very little is 
known about how citizens formulate their opinions of election quality.  Do 
citizens base their assessments on their personal experience during different 
stages of the election cycle or just on events surrounding election day? Do they 
examine the performance of the election commissions, or do they simply 
consider the success of their own parties at the polls? Moreover, to what extent 
are citizens’ perceptions of election quality congruent with other non-
perception-based indicators
2
 of election quality? 
 
The first purpose of the paper is to assess the determinants of citizens’ 
perceptions of election quality. The emerging literature has offered three 
competing explanations: the first points to the performance of institutions 
related to election management (Birch 2008; Hall et al. 2009); the second 
highlights the importance of partisanship  affiliation to the winning or losing 
party of the electoral contest (Moehler 2009; Rose and Mishler 2009); and the 
third focuses on citizens’ experience with electoral irregularities (Bratton 2008; 
Lehoucq 2003).  
 
Using survey data from the Afrobarometer (AB) and the International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) on the 2007 Federal and State 
Elections in Nigeria, I jointly examine the institutional, partisan, and electoral 
irregularity-based determinants of election quality. I find that citizens rely most 
on their evaluations of the election-related institutions
3
 to gauge election quality, 
relative to partisanship and experience with electoral irregularities.  Not 
surprisingly, of the five election-related institutions that I examine in the context 
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 Examples of non-perception based indicators of election quality used in the existing 
literature include voter turnout, opposition boycotts, incidence of election irregularities, and 
election petitions.  
3
 Election-related institutions refer to election management bodies (election commissions) and 




of Nigeria, citizens’ assessment of the electoral commission’s
4
 performance is 
most crucial in their judgments of election quality.  
 
Building on these findings, the second purpose of the paper is to investigate how 
citizens evaluate the performance of electoral commissions. In particular, I 
concentrate on citizens’ evaluations of the autonomy and capacity of the 
electoral commission in Nigeria. My analysis reveals that Nigerians rely more 
upon their assessment of the electoral commission’s autonomy relative to its 
capacity when forming their opinions of election quality.  That is, the extent to 
which the electoral commission can independently carryout its functions without 
interference from government and other political or societal actors, was more 
important to Nigerians than whether it had the institutional capacity to 
effectively manage elections.  
 
The third purpose of the paper is to assess the accuracy of citizens’ opinions on 
election quality.  The existing literature often questions the validity of 
perception-based measures because these measures are often susceptible to 
information deficits or various sources of bias. I gauge the accuracy of citizen 
election perceptions, by probing the correlation between Nigerians’ perceptions 
of election quality and other non-perception based indicators of election quality. 
More specifically, I find that in states where opposition parties filed a high 
number of post-election petitions, Nigerians had a more negative perception of 
the quality of the 2007 elections. My overall aim here is not to interrogate the 
empirical or theoretical importance of citizens’ election quality perceptions, but 
to probe the consistency of these opinions with other measures of election 
quality. 
 
My research makes the following contributions to the literature on election 
quality. First, I expand upon the existing studies by comprehensively testing 
three competing explanations and underscoring the importance of institutional 
performance evaluations.  Second, by looking closely at various dimensions of 
election commission performance, I demonstrate the relative importance of 
institutional autonomy in emerging democracies. And in so doing, I provide 
more rigorous empirical support to the existing literature that explores the role 
of electoral commissions in Africa (Gyimah-Boadi 1999; Debrah 2011). Third, 
this paper is the first, to my knowledge, to test the validity of perception 
measures within the context of fraudulent elections.  
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The following section of the paper examines the literature on the three 
competing explanations on the determinants of election quality perceptions. 
Section 2 briefly summarizes the context of the 2007 elections in Nigeria.  
Section 3 outlines the empirical analysis and discusses the results. Section 4, 
explores the validity of citizens’ perception of election quality, and Section 5 
provides a brief conclusion. 
 
 
Determinants of Election Quality Perceptions 
 
Within the emerging literature on perceptions of election quality there are three 
major explanations on what shapes citizens’ views on electoral quality: 
institutions, partisanship, and electoral irregularities. A main objective of this 
paper is to jointly evaluate these competing explanations and explore their 





Only recently have scholars begun to assess the institutional sources of citizen 
perceptions of election quality. While there have been important strides, the 
perception-based literature is deficient in two primary ways. First, the literature 
has not effectively gauged the influence of electoral commissions (formerly 
referred to as electoral management bodies (EMBs)) on citizens’ evaluation of 
election quality. Second, the literature does not focus on a wide-range of 
institutions related to elections, especially within emerging democratic contexts.   
 
In examining the impact of EMBs, the perceptions-based literature can be 
divided into two main groups.  One set of studies fail out rightly to assess the 
influence of EMB performance in their assessment of perceptions of election 
quality (Rose and Mishler 2009; Moehler 2009).  For instance, Mishler and 
Rose (2009) assess the sources of citizens’ election quality perceptions in the 
context of Russia, and although they highlight the importance of partisanship 
and other socio-demographic factors they do not examine the impact of citizens’ 
evaluations of EMB performance.  
 
A second set of studies, while focusing on EMB performance, only examines a 
single dimension.  As a result, these studies are incapable of reflecting the 
complex relationship between EMB performance and citizens’ election quality 
judgments.  Birch provides the most recent cross-national study on the 
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institutional correlates of election quality using data from 28 elections in 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries 
(2008). She identifies autonomous election administration along with 
proportionality of elections, and public financing of political parties as 
institutional factors which structure confidence in electoral processes. Regarding 
election administration, her findings indicate that citizens living in countries 
with autonomous EMBs are more likely to consider elections as illegitimate.  
Birch’s findings contradict the existing empirical and theoretical literature that 
associates autonomous EMBS with a greater likelihood of free and fair 
elections.
5
 She attributes these counterintuitive results to the fact that formal-
legal independence might not reflect the actual independence of the institution. 
Although I accept Birch’s justification, there remains a lack of consensus on the 
impact of EMB autonomy on citizens’ election perceptions.  
 
A promising series of studies in the American context has also pursued single 
dimensional assessment of EMB performance. Hall et al (2009) focus on EMB 
capacity by exploring citizens’ assessment of poll worker performance in the 
2000 US elections. Interestingly, they find that citizens who rate poll worker 
performance as excellent had greater confidence in the elections. Similarly, 
research carried out by Alvarez et al (2008) shows how citizens’ evaluation of 
the credibility of voting technology has direct, positive implications for their 
confidence in elections.  
 
Despite the new attention to electoral management bodies, the inadequate 
treatment of the multiple dimensions of EMB performance has left gaps in the 
literature.  I distinguish between citizens’ evaluations of EMB capacity and 
EMB autonomy and probe the impact of these evaluations on citizens’ 
perceptions of election quality.  I conceptualize autonomy as an institution’s 
ability to make decisions independent of the control of the executive and other 
state and society actors. Capacity, on the other hand, connotes an institution’s 
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 Various empirical studies find that electoral management bodies that possess high levels of 
autonomy, are more likely to provide the context for free and fair elections (Hartlyn et al. 
2008; Pastor 1999) 
6
 The theoretical basis for a distinction between EMB autonomy and capacity is informed by 
Bratton’s conceptual separation of political autonomy and political capacity: in which 
―autonomy refers to the process in which actors set goals for organizations whereas capacity 
signifies the means of goal realization‖ (1994: 236). 
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A second shortcoming of the perception-based literature is limited institutional 
scope. Although electoral management bodies are the main arbiters of elections 
in many emerging democracies, there are other pivotal election-related 
institutions, which the existing scholarship has overlooked.  These election-
related institutions include the police (and other security forces such as the 
military), the courts and election tribunals, the media, international and domestic 
observers, and other independent and state-based institutions. In this paper, I 
assess five election-related institutions that are crucial for understanding 
elections within the African context:  police, military, judiciary, anti-corruption 
agencies, and the media. The selection of these institutions is rooted both in the 
theoretical and empirical literatures. First, Diamond (2002) regards the impartial 
treatment of rival candidates and parties by the courts, police, and military as an 
essential part of electoral fairness in transitional settings. Specifically within 
Nigeria context, scholars underscore the importance of the police and other 
security agencies (Bratton 2008; Okoigun 2000) courts and election tribunals 





In addition to the import of institutional factors, other studies have examined the 
impact of partisanship on perceptions of election quality (Moehler 2009; 
Alvarez, Hall, and Llewellyn 2008; Birch 2008; Rose and Mishler 2009). 
Partisanship is represented as either an ingrained ideological attachment to a 
political party (Goren 2005) or an affiliation with the winner or loser of the 
electoral contest (Bratton et al. 2005; Anderson and LoTempio 2002). 
Regardless of the dominant method through which citizens are affiliated to 
political parties, this attachment structures their perceptions of election quality. 
Partisanship provides a perceptual frame for interpreting information regarding 
the quality of elections: those affiliated with the winning party are more inclined 
to believe that the success of their party was legitimate, while those affiliated 
with the losing party search for evidence to show that their favored candidate or 
party was shortchanged. In a recent cross-national analysis of citizens’ 
perceptions of election quality in Africa, Moehler (2009) considers affiliation 
with the electoral winner. She finds that, relative to all other factors, ―winner 
status has the largest influence on evaluations of electoral integrity in both 
substantive and statistical terms.‖ Similar research by Alvarez et al (2009) show 
that, within the American context, partisanship has a significant impact on 
citizens’ confidence in the accuracy of the vote count and tabulation for the US 
presidential elections in 2000 and 2004. Republicans, compared to Independents 
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and Democrats, were most likely to display confidence in the elections on the 
grounds that their candidate won the elections.  
 
The main limitation of the political orientations thesis is that it does not 
effectively test the impact of electoral institutions. The empirical models used in 
these studies are underspecified and incapable of accurately adjudicating the 
relative significance of alternative sources of citizens’ election perceptions.  For 
instance, Moehler’s (2009) assessment of the determinants of electoral integrity 
in Africa, fails to control for citizens’ evaluation of any election-related 
institutions. To overcome this shortcoming in the literature, I test the relative 
importance of citizens’ partisan status while controlling for other important 





There are two main ways in which the literature approaches the link between 
electoral irregularities and perceptions of election quality.
7
  First, some studies 
employ indirect measures of electoral irregularities that do not effectively 
capture the extent of the phenomenon and also make it difficult to understand 
the causal effect. For example, Birch uses an aggregate measure of corruption 
perceptions
8
 and assumes that in countries where political corruption is 
pervasive citizens are more likely to consider the administration of elections to 
be corrupt (2008).  While this might be the case, a more direct approach that 
taps into citizens own experience with and perceptions of electoral irregularities 
may more clearly highlight how electoral irregularities shape popular opinions 
on the election.  
 
Another group of studies rely on micro-level data to assess citizens’ perceptions 
of, and experience with, electoral irregularities (Collier and Vicente 2008; 
Alvarez, Hall, and Hyde 2008; McCann and Dominguez 1998; Schaffer 2007; 
Schedler 1999; Bratton 2008).  Bratton carries out a thorough examination of 
citizens’ perceptions of electoral irregularities in the context of the 2007 
Nigerian election campaign period (2008). Nigerians who experience threats of 
violence are less likely to vote in the upcoming elections or support the ruling 
                                           
7
 I define electoral irregularities as the range of illicit activities that political actors employ to 
alter election outcomes or to undermine the electoral process (Lehoucq 2003) . The current 
literature focuses predominantly on four types of irregularities: vote buying, intimidation, 
violence, and ballot rigging (Collier and Vicente 2008; Bratton 2008).  
8
 Birch uses the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) as a proxy for electoral fraud.  
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party. Those offered material benefits in exchange for their votes exude greater 
partisan loyalty; but are no more likely to participate in elections, than those not 
offered.
9
 Although existing studies directly examine citizens’ experience with 
electoral irregularities and deal with the consequences on electoral behavior, 
surprisingly none of them directly test the effect of these experiences on 
citizens’ perceptions of election quality. Nevertheless, these studies are 
instructive because they identify various potential causal pathways between 
experience with election irregularities and evaluations of election quality.  For 
instance, if we build upon Bratton’s (2008) findings regarding the impact of 
intimidation we would expect that citizens who experience irregularities may 
score the elections poorly not only because of their experience but because they 
were also deprived of their constitutional right to participate in the elections.  
 
My main contribution is to see whether citizens believe that the presence of 
electoral irregularities influences the overall outcome of elections. Undoubtedly, 
irregularities occur but it is important to see which types matter and to what 
extent experience or perceptions of electoral irregularities factor in the overall 
perceptions of election quality. 
 
 
How Do Citizens Assess Election Quality? 
 
In addition to outlining the main sources of citizens’ evaluation of election 
quality, I propose specific mechanisms through which citizens construct their 
election quality perceptions. First, I argue that citizens are, for the most part, 
capable of making informed and relatively accurate assessments of the 
legitimacy of election processes that take place in their country.  Similar 
assertions have been made in the existing literature (Birch 2008; Pastor 1999; 
Banducci and Karp 2003).  
 
This research goes a step forward by specifying pathways through which 
citizens formulate their election judgments. 
 
1. Directly, through experience with various stages of the electoral process 
such as voter registration, political party campaigns, polling activities 
(queuing, casting a ballot and observing the poll station count) and 
                                           
9
 Collier and Vicente (2009) arrive at similar findings in Nigeria using a combination of 
survey and field experiments. Most notably that experience and perceptions of violent 
intimidation negatively affect voter-turnout.  
 
 8 
experience with EMB staff (permanent and ad hoc), security officials, and 
members of political parties.  
2. Indirectly, through information obtained from the media (TV, radio, 
newspapers, and internet) political parties, civic organizations, as well as 
popular discourse and face-to-face conversations.  
 
Citizens further combine their assessments from multiple pathways to construct 
their overall assessments of election quality.  When attitudes are formed through 
direct experience, they are more reliable, but limited in scope.  For instance, a 
voter may assess the impartiality of EMB staff working on election day when 
she votes, but may not have first-hand knowledge of the impartiality of other 
EMB staff working in other regions of the country.  However even at this level, 
citizens evaluations can be biased by 1) prior performance evaluations of 
institutions in previous elections; 2) partisan affiliations; 3) social and 
demographic attributes, including education, cognition and ethnicity.  
 
Attitudes constructed through indirect information about electoral processes 
have greater scope and allow citizens a more comprehensive assessment of the 
elections.  Yet, generating a clear picture through this channel depends on 1) the 
availability of information; 2) the accuracy of information; and, 3) citizens’ 
willingness to seek out information on elections. Availability and reliability of 
information on elections is usually a function of a free, independent, vibrant 
media environment that produces high quality information with broad coverage 
throughout the country. Within such an environment, opposition parties will 
have more opportunities to publicize fraud and electoral malpractice, while 
journalists play an active role as watchdogs and whistleblowers during the 
election.  Finally, indirect channels also depend on citizens’ willingness to seek 
out information. Following empirical studies emphasizing the effect that greater 
access to media has on voting behavior (Conroy-Krutz 2009) and political 
attitudes (Bratton et al. 2005) , I contended that citizens with greater access to 
media, will be more informed about various aspects of the elections and thereby 
more likely to develop accurate assessments of the quality of elections.  
 
In sum, I have presented three competing explanations for the sources of 
citizens’ election quality evaluations  election-related institutional 
performance, partisanship, and experience with electoral irregularities. I also 
outlined the process through which citizens construct their election quality 
judgments. The next step is to describe the electoral context in which the study 





2007 Nigeria Election Context 
 
The 2007 Federal and State elections in Nigeria were a watershed that 
represented the third consecutive election since a democratic transition in 1999. 
It was also first time that Nigerians would witness civilian turnover in leadership 
because, at the end of a two-year term in office, President Obasanjo was 
ineligible to run again (Ibrahim 2007). Nevertheless, commentators regarded the 
elections as the worst in the country’s history: a continuation of a downward 
spiral in election quality evident in 1999 and 2003 elections.  During the 2007 
election period, Nigerians witnessed widespread electoral irregularities  such 
as underage voting, ballot box stuffing, voter and observer intimidation, false 
announcement of results and electoral violence including numerous political 
assassinations and approximately 280 deaths between November 2006 and April 
2007 (National Democratic Institute 2007; International Crisis Group 2007 ).  
Local and international observers condemned political parties for perpetuating a 
culture of violence, political assassinations and vote rigging.  Security forces, 
mainly the Nigerian Police Force, were blamed for their blatant support of 
political candidates and their inability to maintain law and order. Independent 
Nigerian Electoral Commission (INEC), the main electoral management body in 
Nigeria, was censured for its lack of independence from executive control, low 
levels of transparency, and ineffective election administration (European Union 
2007).  
 
The incumbent Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) swept the elections winning 
the presidency, a super-majority in the National Assembly, and most of the state 
governorship races. 
10
 However, the conduct of the elections brought so much 
international and domestic condemnation that the newly elected president 
Umaru Yar'Adua in his inauguration speech admitted the illegitimate basis of his 
election and committed to broad-based electoral reform (National Democratic 
Institute 2007). Another indication of the woeful conduct of the 2007 elections 
was seen with the number of petitions filed with the Election Tribunals.
11
 In 
2007, over 1250 election petitions were filed, relative to 560 in 2003 and 400 in 
2011 (Fall et al. 2011). The nature of the irregularities was so pronounced that 
                                           
10
 According to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) Umar Musa 
Yar’Adua of the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) received 24.6 million votes and 
secured the presidency, while Muhammadu Buhari of the All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP) 
received 6.6 million and Vice President Atiku Abubakar, candidate of Action Congress (AC) 
followed with 2.6 million. 
11
 The 1999 Nigerian Constitution (Section 285) and 2006 Electoral Act (Part IX) empowers 
the Electoral Tribunal to hear petitions brought forward by candidates and political parties.  
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tribunals overturned many of the certified election results.  For instance, 
elections results were vacated in 9 out of 36 gubernatorial elections.  
 
 
Role of the Independent National Electoral 
Commission 
 
According to the Nigerian Constitution (1999) and the Electoral Act (2006), the 
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) is the main electoral 
management body in Nigeria. INEC is granted powers to organize Federal and 
State elections, to register voters and political parties, and to monitor party 
financing and political campaigns (Federal Republic of Nigeria Constitution 
1999).  
 
Since its creation in 1999, INEC has been characterized by a lack of 
independence, professionalism and administrative efficiency (Fall et al. 2011). 
The appointment process for INEC commissioners at both the federal and state 
level gives the first indication of the deficiency in INEC’s institutional 
autonomy.  The Constitution gives the President authority to appoint all 12 
INEC commissioners (and the 36 Resident Electoral Commissioners) with the 
approval of the Senate. The presidents’ monopoly over the appointment process 
has direct implications for INEC’s popular legitimacy and its ability to 
impartially organize elections.  Since 1999, opposition parties, civil society and 
the general public perceive the commission as being biased in favor of the 
incumbent government (Report of the Electoral Reform Committee 2008).
12
 In 
fact, when asked to describe the relationship between the President and the 
Chairman of INEC, political elites often repeat a familiar phrase: ―he who pays 
the piper calls the tune‖.
13
 In other words, stakeholders consider the INEC 
chairman to be beholden to the president because the president is responsible for 
his appointment. 
 
Another source of concern has been INEC’s lack of financial independence. The 
Electoral Act (2006) established the INEC Fund to increase the institution’s 
financial autonomy. However, this fund was not implemented during the 2007 
                                           
12
 In fact, one common interpretation of the Electoral Act of 2006 and 2002 was that 
membership on the commission was restricted to card carry members of political parties, as 
electoral commissioners should meet the same qualifications as those seeking to serve as 
members of the House of Representatives (Kew 2007). 
13
 These views were conveyed during interviews with various election stakeholders conducted 
throughout Nigeria in June 2010.  
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election period. Instead, President Obasanjo was accused of using his control 
over the commission’s purse strings to frustrate the effective and timely 
execution of key aspects of electoral administration (European Union 2007; 
National Democratic Institute 2007). Although INEC did not publicize its 
funding difficulties with the executive, other civil society organizations and 
political parties frequently highlighted these problems in the media.  
 
Along with deficiencies in INEC autonomy, the organization also lacked the 
operational and professional capacity to effectively organize the 2007 elections. 
Voter registration, which is considered the hallmark of any successful election, 
was an abysmal failure (Herskovits 2007; Omotola 2009; Fall et al. 2011: 149). 
The registration process was constantly delayed and a highly anticipated direct 
data capture method of registration was only partially implemented. As a result, 
many Nigerians were systematically disenfranchised.  Furthermore politicians 
hijacked the process and inflated the voters’ roll with fictitious names. Although 
INEC was able to register approximately 60 million Nigerians, many 
stakeholders questioned the accuracy and reliability of the voters’ roll.  
 
Deficits in INEC’s professionalism and administrative capacity were brought 
into full public view on election day.  Voters witnessed the late arrival and non-
arrival of election materials. In some states of the South West, there was 
deliberate cancellation of elections and collusion between INEC staff and 
political officials in the stuffing of ballot boxes with pre-marked ballots 
(International Crisis Group 2007 :207). During counting and tabulation, citizens 
also observed the falsification of election results and declaration of elections in 
favor of candidates who failed to receive a majority of votes. One prominent 
example of the manipulation of results was seen with the Gubernatorial elections 
in Anambra state: allegedly, the Resident Electoral Commissioner of Anambra 
state shaved 900,000 votes off one candidate’s vote totals because it exceeded 
the possible number of votes cast in the elections (International Crisis Group 
2007 ).  
 
 
Role of the Police and Security Agencies 
 
The Nigerian Police Force and other security agencies (including the Nigerian 
Military, Civil Defense, and State Security Services) have historically played a 
pivotal role in elections in Nigeria. According to the Electoral Act (2006), police 
are legally mandated to provide security during election campaigns, and they 
fulfill various functions during elections. For instance, on election day it is not 
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uncommon to see security officials mounting roadblocks, guarding individual 
polling stations, and escorting ballot boxes from polling stations to collation 
centers. Despite their centrality to the election process, Nigerians question the 
neutrality and professionalism of the security forces. During 2007 elections, 
there was a widespread view that the president, sitting governors, and politicians 
affiliated with the PDP manipulated members of security agencies for electoral 
gain (National Democratic Institute 2007: 27). Various organizations alleged 
that policemen turned a blind eye to electoral irregularities, while other 
members of the police force were actively engaged in stealing ballot boxes, 
transporting political thugs, and denying opposition voters access to polling 
stations (International Crisis Group 2007 :4). 
 
 
Role of the Judiciary 
 
The Nigerian judiciary has been called upon in pre- and post-election periods to 
adjudicate on election-related cases.  During the pre-election period, fractious 
disputes over political party primaries and a culture of candidate imposition 
prompted many aggrieved candidates to seek redress with the courts. In the post-
election period, losing parties and candidates filed petitions with the Election 
Tribunals. Public confidence in the judiciary increased significantly during and 
after the 2007 elections, because of the judiciary’s apparent autonomy in 
decision-making. Many of its rulings undermined the electoral position of the 
incumbent PDP (Joseph and Kew 2008; Omotola 2010; Fall et al. 2011: 137). 
As noted, Election Tribunals and Supreme Court overturned the election results 
in 9 out of 36 gubernatorial elections in the post-election period. Although some 
commentators describe the court interventions as a perversion of democracy, 
citizens in states where elections were manipulated saw the court actions as a 
democratic safeguard. To them, the courts provided democratic justice where 











The main purpose of this paper is to assess the determinants of citizens’ 
perceptions of election quality. To this end, I present the following hypotheses 
that highlight three competing explanations:  
 
Institutional Explanations: 
H1: Citizens with positive evaluations of the performance of election-related 
institutions are more likely to perceive elections as being free and fair. 
 
Partisanship Explanations: 
H2: Citizens affiliated with the party of the electoral winner are more likely to 
perceive elections as free and fair.  
 
Election Irregularities Explanations: 
H3: Citizens who experience electoral irregularities are less likely to perceive 
elections as free and fair.  
 
I test these hypotheses in the context of the April 2007 Presidential, National 






Data and Methods 
 
Perceptions of Election Quality 
The main dependent variable, perceived election quality, captures respondents’ 
perceptions of the quality of the 2007 elections. 
15
  Respondents were asked ―On 
the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national 
election held in 2007‖. Potential responses included ―Not Free and Fair, Free 
                                           
14
 Afrobarometer (AB) conducted the survey in Nigeria in May 2008 with a nationally 
representative sample of 2408 Nigerians that allows for inferences to the national population 
based on +2 margin of error. For more information see: wwww.afrobarometer.org 
15
 Information on the coding of all variables are included in Appendix A 
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and Fair with Major Problems, Free and Fair with Minor Problems, Completely 
Free and Fair‖. The original variable is re-scaled into a dichotomous variable 
with 1 indicating that citizens perceived the elections as ―completely free and 
fair‖ or ―free and fair with minor problems‖, while 0 denotes the elections as 







Moving to the potential explanatory factors. I assess the institutional hypothesis 
by examining the performance of five institutions responsible for election 
management in Nigeria: 1) Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), 
2) Nigerian Police Force, 3) Nigerian Military, 4) Election Tribunals, and, 5) 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)
17
. The basic expectation is 
that citizens who view the performance of these institutions in favorable terms 
will more likely to consider the conduct of the elections to be free and fair.  As 
mentioned previously, the literature has focused disproportionately on the effect 
of electoral commissions on election quality; here I expand the scope of the 
institutional focus to include a range of institutions that are related to election 





In addition to assessing the influence of institutional performance on citizens’ 
election judgments, I incorporate measures of institutional trust for the five 
institutions mentioned above. I am interested in gauging whether institutional 
trust has a distinct association with perceptions of election quality relative to the 
                                           
16
 Birch (2008) employs a similar binary measure using CSES data while Moehler (2009) and 
Bratton (2007) used the original ordinal measure with AB data.  Although, re-scaling election 
quality as a binary variable may limit the variability in citizens’ evaluations, I employ the use 
of the measure because it provides better interpretation of the results.  As will be further 
highlighted, all empirical models using perceptions of election quality as the DV have been 
estimated using both the dichotomous and ordinal measures and there moderate differences in 
the results (see Appendix B). Another potential concern is the reliability of using a single item 
indicator as the dependent variable, however as pointed out by Anderson et al (2005) the main 
problem associated with using a single item is lower significance levels, importantly however 
this will not bias the regression estimates.  
17
 The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) is a Nigerian law enforcement 
agency responsible for investigating financial crimes. Established in 2003, the agency became 
very influential during the 2007 elections as it prosecuted numerous political candidates.  
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direct questions on institutional performance evaluations.  I expect institutional 







I develop a measure for partisanship based on a question that assesses whether 
citizens indicate 1) an affiliation with the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP)the 
winner of the 2007 presidential election; 2) affiliation with any of the 
oppositions parties; 3) or no affiliation with any political parties (i.e. non-
partisans). My expectation is that citizens affiliated with the PDP are more likely 




Perceptions of Electoral Irregularities  
 
I examine perceptions of electoral irregularities using three indicators: 1) fear of 
intimidation and violence, 2) freedom to vote, and 3) ballot secrecy. I use an 
indicator for fear of intimidation and violence that asks respondents the extent to 
which they personally fear becoming a victim. A second indicator assesses 
citizens’ perceived ability to vote ―without feeling pressured‖. Although this 
question has normally been used as a measure of procedural liberty, I believe 
that it provides another proxy for the extent of intimidation voters may 
experience. The third indicator gauges whether citizens believe that their voting 
decisions are private. Ballot secrecy is a core requirement of Nigerian legal 
framework and regional and international electoral law. The violation of this 
principle represents an electoral irregularity, for example if influential 
individuals circumvent electoral safeguards in order to monitor citizens’ voting 
decisions. The main expectation is that citizens, who fear intimidation and 
violence, worry about being pressured, and doubt the secrecy of the ballot are 
less likely to have confidence in the quality of elections.  
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 The focus on institutional trust is informed both by the extant literature and fieldwork 
experience. Following the work by Mishler and Rose (2001), institutional trust can reflect 
both citizens’ most recent evaluation of the institution’s performance as well as historical 
evaluations. While we expect citizens’ trust in the EMB to be closely related to their 
performance evaluations, there are instances in which the two attitudes may deviate, in that 
citizens might not trust an institution given its long history of producing unfavorable outputs, 







Along with the main independent variables, I also include a series of controls 
that the literature highlights as being correlated with perceptions of election 
quality.  We include two indicators of citizens’ level of political engagement, 
whether a respondent was registered to vote and whether the respondent voted in 
the 2007 elections.  I propose that voters are more likely to consider elections 
credible relative to non-voters; moreover, the experience of registering and 
actually voting will help citizens develop more accurate assessment of election 
quality. I also control for citizens’ level of political sophistication through two 
indices. First is political interest, which includes two items weighted on a scale 
from 0-1: citizens’ interest in public affairs and frequency of discussing politics. 
Second is media exposure, which includes three items weighted on a scale from 
0-1: frequency of obtaining news from radio, TV, and newspaper.  I expect that 
access to information will enhance citizens’ ability to accurately evaluate 
election quality.  Controls are included for evaluations of government 
performance which includes five items on a scale from 0-1, and economic 
performance, which includes two items that examine present egotropic and 
sociotropic evaluations. Lastly, I control for various dimensions of social 
structure: age, gender, level of education, urban/rural location, co-ethnicity with 





Nigerians’ Perceptions of the Quality of the 2007 Elections 
 
Almost a year after the 2007 elections, the Afrobarometer asked Nigerians to 
assess the quality of the 2007 elections (AB Round 4). According to Figure 1, a 
plurality of respondents rated the elections as ―Not free and fair‖ (37%), while 
one-quarter of respondents saw the elections as  ―Free and fair with major 
problems‖ (26%). When these two categories are combined almost two-thirds of 
Nigerians (63%) offered a negative evaluation of the electoral process.  Not 
surprisingly, only seven percent of those interviewed were convinced of the 




Figure 1: Nigerians perception of election quality 
 
 
Source: Nigeria Afrobarometer Round 4 (2008) 
 
 
Nigerians’ Evaluations of Election-related Institutions  
 
We now switch our focus to citizens’ performance evaluations of INEC, Police, 
Military, Election tribunals and the EFCC during the 2007 elections.  As 
highlighted in Figure 2, of the five institutions, Nigerians were most critical of 
the performance of the police with sixty-two percent expressing dissatisfaction. 
INEC followed a close second as a majority of Nigerians (58%) graded the 
election commission as either ―very poor‖ or ―fairly poor‖. Nigerians were 
almost split on the performance of the military (46% dissatisfied versus 44% 
satisfied); while a minority of Nigerians were unimpressed with the performance 




                                           
19
 Of all the agencies Nigerians were least knowledgeable about the EFCC (18%); this is 




Figure 2: Nigerians’ Evaluations of Election-related Institutions 
(Percentage Dissatisfied with Performance) 
 
 
Source: Nigeria Afrobarometer Round 4 (2008) 
Note: The percentage of dissatisfied include respondents who indicated they 
were ―not at all satisfied‖ or not very satisfied‖ with the Police, EFCC, and 
Military, and respondents who indicated that the performance of INEC and 
Election Tribunal was ―poor‖ or ―very poor‖.  
 
 
Nigerians’ Partisan Attachments  
 
Next, I examine citizens’ affiliation to the winning and losing parties in the 2007 
elections. Almost half of the respondents (48%) classified themselves as non-
partisans. The remaining respondents were split in their allegiances: twenty-
eight percent said they were affiliated with the opposition, while twenty-four 
percent reported being close to the ruling PDP.  
 
 
Perceptions of Electoral Irregularities 
 
Finally I examine perceptions of election irregularities. In Nigeria over four in 
ten respondents were significantly fearful of intimidation and violence. While an 
overwhelming majority of Nigerians (71%) believed that they were free to 
choose whom to vote, the results were starkly different for ballot secrecy.  Over 
forty percent of Nigerians felt that powerful individuals were either ―somewhat‖ 








I begin the analysis by estimating the influence of institutional performance, 
partisanship, and electoral irregularities on citizens’ perceptions of election 
quality (coded as a dichotomous variable) while controlling for other election-
related and demographic factors.   
 
The results of a logistic regression model are shown in Table 1. First, the results 
indicate that the performance of INEC, Military and the EFCC matter for 
perceptions of electoral fairness (as demonstrated by the significant 
coefficients). Citizens who express dissatisfaction with the performance of these 
three institutions were likely to see the election quality as unfavorable. Citizens’ 
evaluations of the Police and Election Tribunals did not have a statically 
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 Given the prominence of the police in elections, the absence of a significant effect on 
perceptions of elections quality is puzzling. In an attempt to understand the finding, I ran 
subsequent models without the military, and found that citizens’ evaluations of police 
performance had a meaningful impact election quality.   
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Table 1: Determinants of citizens’ perceptions of election quality  
 
Variables Unstand. Coefficients  Standard errors 
Institutional Performance Evaluations   
INEC  .641***  .083 
Police  .136 .095 
Military  .291*** .103 
EFCC  .372*** .093 
Election Tribunal  .048  .068 
Institutional Trust   
INEC  .205** .093 
       Police  -.026 .081 
       EFCC -.053 .093 
       Election Tribunal .03 .096 
 Partisanship (reference ruling party 
partisan) 
  
Opposition Partisans -.434** .185 
Non-partisans -.535*** .181 
Electoral Irregularities   
Fear of Intimidation -.224***  .068 
Freedom to Vote .098 .075 
Ballot Secrecy .003 .073 
Participation and Engagement   
Registered to vote in 2007 Elections -.296  .403 
Voted in 2007 Elections .359*  .165 
Political Sophistication   
Index of Political Interests .224  .268 
      Index of Media Exposure -.608* .355 
Evaluations of Government Performance   
        Government .539 .457 
        Economic  .359  .343 
Social Structure   
Age  -.003  .006 
Female -.335**  .142 
Urban Resident .441*** .155 
Education  -.009  .0416 
Ethnic Discrimination  -.256  .249 
Constant -3.896 .653 
Log-likelihood  -659.803 
LR   454.28*** 
Observations   1375 
Pseudo R2  0.2561 
Note: DV Perceptions of Election Quality (0=Not Free and Fair 1= Free and Fair). Nigeria 
Afrobarometer Round 4 (2008). All tests are two tailed. *** p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1; Model also 
included controls for the six geo-political zones (not shown).  
 
The results also indicate that trust in INEC is positively associated with 
perceptions of election quality.  Importantly, this correlation suggests that 
Nigerians’ assessment of election quality is influenced not only by the 
immediate evaluations of the institutions’ performance during 2007 elections, 
but also by the level of trust that has developed with the institution over time.  
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However, citizens’ distrust of other institutions has no meaningful impact on 




The partisanship hypothesis is largely confirmed. Opposition partisans and non-
partisans are more likely to see elections as not free and fair when compared to 
citizens affiliated with the ruling Peoples Democratic Party. Regarding 
perceptions of election irregularities, citizens who express concern about being 
victimized during elections are less likely to consider elections free and fair. 





As hypothesized, sophisticated and well-informed voters were more likely to see 
elections as legitimate. Although, interest in politics did not affect citizen 
judgments, their degree of media exposure did. Nigerians with greater exposure 
to media were more critical of the quality of elections and likely to see them as 
unacceptable. This finding underscores the important role that mass media 
outlets play in disseminating information about elections, and the role that 
media exposure plays in increasing citizens’ ability to critically assess various 
democratic processes.  Furthermore, citizens with positive evaluations of 
government performance expectantly view election conduct more legitimately. 
Finally, urban respondents are more likely to consider elections free and fair, 
while females were more critical of election quality.  
 
 
What Matters Most:  Institutions, Political 
Orientations, or Perceptions of Electoral 
Irregularities? 
 
Given that I find empirical support for all conjectures regarding the effects of 
institutions, partisanship and electoral irregularities, I use predicted probabilities 
to highlight the relative substantive effects of the main variables.
23
 Figure 3 
illustrates the change in predicted probability of a respondent perceiving 
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 This result holds even in models in which trust in INEC is not included.  
22
 To ensure that the effects of Fear of Intimidation did not overshadow the results regarding 
Secrecy of the Ballot and Freedom to Vote, I estimated another model without Fear of 
Intimidation and both variables remained insignificant.   
23
 All predicted probability estimates were calculated on Model 1 in Table 1 using Clarify 
(Tomz et al. 2003). When all variables in the model are held at their mean the predicted 
probability that a respondent will have positive evaluations of election quality is 0.3.  
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The strongest predictor is the performance of INEC.  For instance, when citizens 
are highly satisfied with the performance of INEC, they are thirty-five percent 
more likely to consider the 2007 election free and fair.  Furthermore, 
performance evaluations of election-related institutions INEC, EFCC and the 
Military  have a greater substantive influence on election quality evaluations 
compared to partisanship and experience with electoral irregularities.  Those 
who fear intimidation are fifteen percent less likely to assess elections quality 
favorably, while Nigerians who would vote for opposition parties are eleven 
percent less likely to consider elections free and fair.  These findings suggest 
that Nigerians place more emphasis on the performance of election–related 
institutions than on political affiliations and experience with election 
irregularities when forming opinions about the quality of elections. 
 





Citizens’ Evaluation of INEC Autonomy and Capacity  
 
Results of the statistical analysis confirm many findings in the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the import of election management bodies to election 
quality.  However, the results also present opportunities for further inquiry. 
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 For the marginal effects calculations, all non-binary independent variables are held at their 




Given an electoral context characterized by widespread irregularities, what 
dimensions of EMB institutional performance do citizens regard as most 
important? Are citizens able to distinguish between EMB autonomy and EMB 
capacity?  
 
To address these questions, I utilize data from International Foundation of 
Electoral Systems (IFES) post-election survey conducted in Nigeria 
immediately after the 2007 elections.
25
  I incorporate this survey because it 
includes a battery of questions that probe citizens’ evaluations of different 
aspects of the election process, specifically examining dimensions of INEC 
capacity and autonomy.  
 
The main variable of interest is perceptions of election quality. IFES ask 
respondents: ―In your opinion, how free and fair were the 2007 Presidential and 
Parliamentary elections? Were the 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary elections 
completely free and fair, somewhat free and fair, not too free and fair or not at 
all free and fair?‖ As done in the previous analysis with Afrobarometer data, I 




Moving to the main explanatory variables, I separate INEC performance into 
two dimensions: 1) autonomy, and 2) capacity, and examine both aspects 
separately but simultaneously. First, I utilize an index of three questions to 
operationalize Nigerians’ perceptions of the INEC’s autonomy in the 2007 
elections. The IFES survey investigates respondents’ evaluations of 1) the 
overall neutrality of INEC, 2) the impartiality of poll workers; and, 3) the 
impartiality of the counting and tabulation processes. The Autonomy Index 




The other main causal variable represents the perceived capacity of INEC. I 
gauge perceived capacity through a composite index constructed from four 
questions that gauge respondents’ opinions about aspects of the administration 
of elections. These include citizens’ satisfaction with the voter registration 
process, their evaluation of the adequacy of information regarding the poll 
location and voting procedures, and their judgments about competence of poll 
workers and the adequacy of poll facilities. The Capacity Index ranges from 0 to 
1 with increasing levels of perceived capacity.
28
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 IFES conducted the survey between May 3 and 10 with a nationally representative sample 
of 2,416 Nigerians that allows for national inferences based on +2 margin of error.   
26
 See Appendix C for coding criteria of the variables used in this analysis.  
27
 The Autonomy Index has a Chronbach’s alpha of 0.752 
28
 The Capacity Index has a Chronbach’s alpha of 0.829 
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Additionally, I examine the performance of the police and include an indicator 
for the performance of the media. The IFES survey, however, does not include 
questions examining the performance of the EFCC, or Election Tribunals.  In 
terms of institutional trust, we also include measures of institutional trust for 
INEC, Police, EFCC, and the Media. The IFES survey asks slightly different 
questions regarding electoral irregularities. The item on ballot secrecy is similar 
to the Afrobarometer survey, but IFES adds three additional questions that 
gauge experience with intimidation, vote buying, and violence.  I expect that 
experience with intimidation should reduce perceptions of election quality, 
while the effect of experience with vote buying may be ambiguous given the 
acceptability of the practice in Nigeria. I also include controls for political 
engagement, political sophistication, performance evaluations, and social 
structure.  
 
Again, I estimate the determinants of perceptions of election quality using a 
logistic regression model.  The findings bear many similarities to the previous 
analysis with Afrobarometer data. The results in Table 2 reveal that Nigerians 
evaluations of INEC autonomy and capacity are both positively correlated with 
perceptions of election quality. That is, the more Nigerians believe that INEC is 
autonomous from the control of political elite and the more it has the capacity to 
effectively administer elections the more citizens regard elections as credible.  
The predicted probabilities in Figure 4 provide further insight on the dimensions 
of INEC capacity and autonomy. The more positive Nigerians’ evaluations of 
INEC capacity and autonomy the more favorable their judgment of election 
quality. Importantly, however, citizen evaluations of INEC autonomy have a 
greater impact on their judgments of election quality, than do their perceptions 
of administrative capacity. That is, Nigerians who believe that INEC has a 
degree of autonomy are forty-eight percent more likely to consider the 2007 
elections favorable, while Nigerians who think that INEC has a high degree of 
capacity are thirty-two percent more likely to consider the elections favorably.
29
  
Based on these findings we can infer that, while both dimensions of institutional 
performance matter, citizens pay more attention to an EMB’s institutional 
autonomy than to its capacity.  
 
Finally, Table 2 indicates that trust in INEC is positively correlated with 
perceptions of election quality. But citizens’ performance evaluations or degree 
of trust in other institutions fail to record any significant association with 
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 Predicted probability estimates are based on the model in Table 3 and calculated with 
Clarify (Tomz et al 2003). For the predicted probability analysis, all non-binary independent 




perceived election quality.  As hypothesized, citizens affiliated with the PDP 
were more likely to view the elections in a favorable light, while citizens who 
experienced intimidation and those who were affected by violence held more 
negative evaluations. However, experience with vote buying had no impact on 
popular election quality judgments. Finally, media savvy respondents were more 
critical of the quality of elections, while voter participation had positive effects 
on perceived election quality.   
 





Institutional Performance Evaluations   
EMB Autonomy Index 2.418***  .341 
EMB Capacity Index 1.446***  .495 
Institutional Trust    
EMB Trust 0.389***  .111 
Police Election Perform 0.141  .113 
Police Trust  0.005  .102 
Media Performance 0.054  .122 
Media Trust  0.036 [.105]  
Partisanship    
Support Ruling Party  0.690 ***  0.098 
Electoral Irregularities    
Experience w/ Intimidation -0.633** .239 
Experience w/ Vote Buying -0.037 .222 
Experience w/ Violence -0.602***  .120 
Participation and Engagement   
Voted in Last Election 0.399*  .227 
Political Sophistication   
Index of Political Interests 0.091  .097 
       Index of Media Exposure -1.057** 0.434 
Government Performance .335***  .096 
Social Structure   
       Education  .068  .039 
       Age  .001  .007 
       Female -.05  .181 
       Urban Resident .235  .190 
Constant -4.462***  .605 
Log-likelihood  -470.850 
LR   893.67*** 
Observations     1327 
Pseudo R2     0.487 
DV: Perceptions of Election Quality: (IFES) Nigeria 2007 Post Election Survey. 
All tests are two tailed. *** p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1 ** Model also included controls for six regions as 




Figure 4: Impact of INEC Autonomy and Capacity on Predicted Probability of 





Perceptions vs. Reality 
 
Empirical analyses provide robust support for the importance of election-related 
institutions, partisanship, and experience with electoral irregularities in shaping 
citizens’ understandings of free and fair elections.  Yet one potential criticism of 
perception-based measures of election quality is that they may be incongruent 




How much confidence should we have in the validity of citizens’ perceptions?
31
  
The empirical and theoretical literature on perceptions-based measures of 
election quality is contested in this regard. Some studies assert the accuracy and 
representativeness of perception-based assessments derived from survey data 
(Birch 2008; Pastor 1999; Banducci and Karp 2003; Schedler 1999; Rose and 
Mishler 2009). Other studies have been more cautious in pointing out the 
                                           
30
 Although, there are limitations to use of perception-based measures the important fact is 
that perceptions shape political behavior; gauging citizens election quality evaluations give 
insight into phenomenon such as popular support for democratic governance (Bratton et al, 
2005; Bratton 2007); state legitimacy (Alemika 2007; Moehler 2009); likelihood of post-
election violence (Gazibo 2009).  
31
 Here I use the term validity not in the strict statistical sense. Instead, validity represents the 
degree to which citizens’ perceptions of election quality are congruent with other non-
perceptions-based measures of election quality.  
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limitations and potential sources of bias (Moehler 2009; Mozaffar and Schedler 
2002). 
 
I explore this debate by seeing how well survey-based perceptions correlate with 
the number of election petitions filed by candidates and political parties to the 
Election Tribunal after the 2007 Nigerian elections. In Nigeria candidates and 
political parties have the right to challenge the outcome of elections by 
submitting petitions to special courts called Election Tribunals. According to the 
Electoral Act  (2006), there are four conditions under which candidates or 
political parties can question the outcome of the elections:  
 
1. An accused candidate is unqualified to contest the elections;  
2. The election was invalid as a result of election irregularities or 
contravention with articles of the electoral act; 
3. An accused candidate did not receive the majority of votes; 
4. A petitioner was duly nominated but unlawfully excluded from the 
elections.  
 
Most of the petitions during the 2007 elections arose out of disputes over 
election irregularities (2) and the improper declaration of results (3) (Fall et al. 
2011). I suggest that the number of petitions may provide a reliable indication of 
the quality of elections in a specific region. In regions where political candidates 
challenge election results through the courts, it is very likely that citizens had 
first-hand experience with, or gained information about, the circumstances that 
brought the election into disrepute. We can, therefore, have greater confidence 
in the accuracy of citizens’ perception of election quality if these perceptions are 
negatively correlated with the number of election petitions.  
 
There is a general tendency for losing candidates and parties to challenge 
election results regardless of the overall quality of the election. However, I think 
that the use of election petitions as a measure of election quality is appropriate 
for the following reasons. First, existing studies have employed the number of 
post-election court cases as a indicator of the quality of election, or more 
specifically the magnitude of fraud that occurs during elections (Lehoucq 2003). 
Second, as it pertains to Nigeria, the legal framework for elections sets explicit 
guidelines for the grounds under which petitions can be made. In court, 
petitioners usually present credible evidence to substantiate their challenges.  
Thirdly, a significant proportion of petitions in the 2007 elections resulted in 
cases and a significant proportion of these cases led to the overturn of the 




The number of election tribunal petitions filed by candidates and political parties 
in the State (State Assembly and Governorship) and Federal (House of 
Representatives and Senate) elections for each of the 36 states in Nigeria varies 
from a high of 134 in Anambra to a low of 5 in Jigawa with a mean of 34.
 32
 
Because the number of representatives elected to the State Assembly and the 
National Assembly varies by each states’ population, I control for this variation 
by weighting the number of petitions by the number of Federal House of 
Representative members allotted to each state. I then calculate the mean value of 
citizens’ perception of election quality for respondents surveyed in each state 
using Afrobarometer data.  As noted, the Afrobarometer survey asks 
respondents to rate ― the freeness and fairness of the last election in 2007‖, 
respondents could rate the election ―Not Free and Fair, Free and Fair with Major 
Problems, Free and Fair with Minor Problems, Completely Free and Fair.‖ 
Citizen perceptions of election quality aggregated at the state level ranges from 
a low of 0.46 in Anambra to a high of 1.71 in Taraba, with a mean of 1.0.  
 
I find a modest but significant negative correlation between citizens’ perceptions 
of election quality aggregated at the state level and the number of election 
petitions filed by candidates and parties within each state.
33
 The negative 
relationship is consistent with expectations and gives support to the idea that 
citizens in states where candidates submitted a high number of petitions to the 
election tribunal were also likely to adjudge elections as illegitimate.
34
 I can 
infer from this finding that during the 2007 Nigerian elections popular 
evaluations of election quality were largely in line with the actual conduct of 
elections in various parts of the country.  
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 See Appendix D for a table of the Electoral Tribunal Petitions for each state.  
33
 Pearson’s correlation coefficient of  -0.37, significant at the 0.05 level. 
34
 To ensure the robustness of the results, I also conducted the correlation using IFES-post 
election data and the results were similar to those presented in the paper (Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient of -0.45: significant at the 0.01 level). The survey was collected 
immediately after the elections in 2007, before the election petitions were publicized.  This 
allows us to control for the effect that knowledge about the tribunal petitions may have on 
citizens’ perceptions of election quality.  As a second robustness check, I also aggregate the 
number of petitions and respondents election quality perceptions to the zonal level. Nigeria is 
divided into 6 geo-political zones, comprised of 5-6 states: South West, South East, South 
South, North West, North East, North Central. By aggregating to the zonal level, I have a 
sufficiently larger sample sizes to make more meaningful inferences. The results of the 
correlation are expectedly higher than the previous results based on aggregation at the state 
level. (Pearson correlation of  -0.891 for the Afrobarometer survey and -0.92 for the IFES 






In this paper, I have probed the determinants of Africans perceptions of election 
quality. Using two rounds of election surveys on the 2007 Nigerian Federal and 
State elections, I find citizens’ performance evaluations of electoral-related 
institutions matter more than their experience with electoral irregularities or 
their political party affiliations. Of the five election-related institutions I 
examine, Nigerians rely significantly on their perceptions of the performance of 
Independent National Electoral Commission (the main election management 
body) when forming their opinions on the credibility of the elections.  I also 
probe two important dimensions of institutional performance: autonomy and 
capacity.  Interestingly, the results indicate that Nigerians are more concerned 
with the political autonomy of INEC and more forgiving of procedural 
irregularities that stem from deficiencies in INEC administrative capacity.  
 
These findings from Nigeria underscore the centrality of electoral management 
bodies in elections in emerging democracies. The autonomy of electoral 
management body is an important pre-requisite for elections to be considered 
credible.  This is not to say that EMB capacity is not important; but citizens are 
more critical of EMB capacity when the autonomy of the body has been well 
established.  For instance, in South Africa, citizens have considered the main 
EMB (Independent Electoral Commission) autonomous for a series of national 
elections.  South Africans therefore currently focus their criticisms on the 
problems related to IEC institutional capacity such as the poor quality of voting 
facilities, long lines during voting, and unavailability of electronic voting.  
Either way, it is clear that citizens base their assessment primarily on their own 
experiences with election-related institutions. From a policy perspective, 
African governments and development partners should therefore devote more 
resources to enhancing the impartiality and competence of election management 
bodies, as well as security agencies and the judiciary. 
 
A second purpose of the paper was to empirically assess the validity of citizens’ 
perceptions of election quality.  The results are encouraging. Perceptions of 
election quality aggregated for each of Nigeria’s 36 states are consistent with the 
number of post-election petitions submitted to Election Tribunals. Importantly, 
these findings show that although there may be gaps between perception-based 
and non-perception-based measures of election quality, scholars should embrace 
the use perception-based data on election quality and devise better methods of 
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Appendix A: Nigeria Afrobarometer Round 4 (2008) 
Survey: Variable Coding 
 
Variable Name  Question Wording Variable Coding 
Perceived Election 
Quality 
Q71R: On the whole, how would you rate the freeness 
and fairness of the last national election  
1= completely free and fair/ Free 
and fair with minor problems,  
0=Free and Fair with major 
problems/Not free and fair).  
INEC Performance 
[Election Tribunal] 
Q76B_NIG_R: How would you evaluate the 
Independent National Electoral Commission’s 
(INEC’s) performance in conducting the April 2007 
national elections? 
0=Very poor, 1= Fairly poor, 
2=Fairly good, 3=Very good, 
INEC Trust [Police, 
Military, EFCC, Electoral 
Tribunal] 
Q49C_R2: How much do you trust each of the 
following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to 
say: The Independent National Electoral Commission 
(INEC)? 
0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 




Q75A_NIG_R: How satisfied were you with the 
performance of the following security forces during 
the April 2007 elections, 
0=Not at all satisfied, 1=Not very 
satisfied, 2=Fairly satisfied, 
3=Very satisfied, 
Partisanship  




Q86_R2: Do you feel close to any political party: 
Used three dummy variables to represent the three 
categories 
 
Vote choice  Q97_R2: Which presidential party would you vote for 
if elections were held tomorrow 
0= other party 
1= Neutral  
2= incumbent 
Fear of intimidation Q47_R: During election campaigns in this country, 
how much do you personally fear becoming a victim 
of political intimidation or violence? 
0=A lot, 1=Somewhat, 2=A little 
bit, 3=Not at all 
Freedom to vote Q15C_R: In this country, how free are you: To choose 
who to vote for without feeling pressured? 
1=Not at all free, 2=Not very free, 
3=Somewhat free, 4=Completely 
free 
Ballot Secrecy Q48A_R: How likely do you think it is: That powerful 
people can find out how you voted, even though there 
is supposed to be a secret ballot in this country? 
0=Not at all likely, 1=Not very 
likely, 2=Somewhat likely, 
3=Very likely 
Voted in last election Q23D_R2: With regard to the most recent, 2007 
national elections, which statement is true for you? 
1=Voted in elections; 0= Did not 
vote in elections 
Registered to Vote Q23D_R: With regard to the most recent, 2007 
national elections, which statement is true for you? 
0=Did not Register; 1=Registered  
 
Political Interest Q13_14sum: How interested would you say you are in 
public affairs?  
When you get together with your friends or family, 
would you say you discuss political matters (weighted 
sum) 
0=low interest; 1= high interest 
 
Media Exposure Q12ACsum: How often do you get news from the 
following sources: Radio, TV, and Newspapers. 
0=low sophistication; 1=high 
sophistication 
Government Performance Q57ADsum: Now let’s speak about the present 
government of this country. How well or badly would 
you say the current government is handling the 
following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to 
say: Managing the economy, Improving the living 
standards of the poor. Creating jobs, Keeping prices 
down? 
0= very badly; 1=very well 
 
 34 
Economic Performance Q4ADsum: In general, how would you describe: The 
present economic condition of this country// Your 
own present living conditions? 
0=very bad; 1=very good 
Age recoded Q1_R  18-101 
Female Respondent  Q110_R 0=Male; 1=Female 
Level of education  Q101_R  0 No formal schooling; 9 Post-
graduate 
Region  1 "NC" 2 "NE" 3 "NW" 4 "SE" 5 
"SS" 6 "SW" 634 "FCT" 
Geo-political Zones North Central Zone=1 North East Zone= 2 North 
West Zones=3 South East Zone=4 South South 
Zone=5 South West Zone= 6  
North Central Zone=1 North East 
Zone= 2 North West Zones=3 
South East Zone=4 South South 
Zone=5 South West Zone= 6 





Appendix B: Determinants of Citizens’ Perceptions 
of Election Quality - Logistic Regression  
 
Variables Unstand. Coefficients  Standard errors 
Institutional Performance Evaluations   
INEC  .681***  .068 
Police  .181 ** .077 
Military  .101 .07 
EFCC  .307*** .093 
Election Tribunal  .070  .068 
Institutional Trust   
INEC  .139* .072 
       Police  .079 .063 
       EFCC .050 .0714 
       Election Tribunal -.005 .071 
 Partisanship (reference ruling party 
partisan) 
  
Opposition Partisan -.167 .145 
Non-partisan -.067* .143 
Electoral Irregularities   
Fear of Intimidation -.173***  .052 
Freedom to Vote .107* .056 
Ballot Secrecy .024 .073 
Participation and Engagement   
Registered to vote in 2007 Elections -.665**  .303 
Voted in 2007 Elections .361*** .126 
Political Sophistication   
Index of Political Interests -.189  .205 
        Index of Media Exposure -.375 .351 
Evaluations of Government Performance   
        Government .539 .457 
        Economic  .359  .343 
Social Structure   
Age  -.003  .006 
Female -.354*** .142 
Urban Resident .353*** .159 
Education  -.009  .0416 
Ethnic Discrimination  -.210  .181 
/ Cut 1  .803 .534 
/ Cut 2 2.37 .538 
/ Cut 3 4.67 .548 
Log-likelihood  -1463.147 
LR   588.47*** 
Observations   1375 
Pseudo R2  0.1674 
Note: DV Perceptions of Election Quality (3= completely free and fair; 2= free and fair with minor 
problems,  
1=Free and Fair with major problems; 0=Not free and fair). 
Nigeria Afrobarometer Round 4 (2008) All tests are two tailed. *** p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1; Model also 
included controls for the six geo-political zones (not shown). I can also reject the parallel regression 





Appendix C: IFES-Post Election Survey: Variable 
Coding 
 
Variable Name Question Wording Variable Coding 
Overall Election Quality  Q32_R :In your opinion, how free and fair were the 
2007 Presidential and Parliamentary elections? Were 
the 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary elections 
completely free and fair, somewhat free and fair, not 
too free and fair or not at all free and fair?  
1= completely free and fair/ Free 
and fair with minor problems,  
0=Free and Fair with major 
problems/Not free and fair).  
EMB Performance Q23F_R: In your opinion, how effective are each of 
these institutions and leaders in carrying out the duties 
that are their responsibility? Are these institutions and 
leaders very effective, somewhat effective, not too 
effective, or not at all effective 
0=Very poor, 1= Fairly poor, 
2=Fairly good, 3=Very good, 
Voter Registration  Q34A_R: Please tell me how satisfied or dissatisfied 
you were with the following aspects of the 2007 
Presidential and Parliamentary elections: Voter 
Registration Process 
(0= Very dissatisfied;1= Somewhat 
dissatisfied; 2= Somewhat 
satisfied; 3= Very satisfied). 
 
Info on voting  Q34B_R : Information on voting procedures and how 
to mark the ballots 
Competency Poll staff  Q34D_R : Competency of the polling station staff 
Adequacy of Facilities 
 
Q34E_R : Adequacy of facilities and equipment at the 
polling station 
Capacity Index Weighted average of the 4 items rescaled from 0-1 
(Chronbach’s alpha: 0.829) 
0= low autonomy; 1=high 
autonomy 
EMB Trust Q10N_R: And how much confidence do you have in 
the Independent National Electoral Commission 
(INEC)? 
(0 "Not at all effective") (1 "Not 
too effective") (2 "somewhat 
effective") (3= "Very Effective") 
Police Election 
Performance  
Q34G_R: Performance of the police and security 
officials in keeping these elections peaceful and 
conflict free 
(1= Very dissatisfied; 2= 
Somewhat dissatisfied; 3= 
Somewhat satisfied; 4= Very 
satisfied). 
Police Trust Q10B_R: How much do you trust each of the 
following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to 
say: The Police? 
(1= ―None at all‖; 2= ―Not too 
much‖; 3= ―Fair amount‖; 4= 
―Great Deal‖) 
Media Performance Q23G: In your opinion, how effective are each of 
these institutions and leaders in carrying out the duties 
that are their responsibility? 
 
Impartiality of Poll 
Workers Q34F_R 
Please tell me how satisfied or dissatisfied you were 
with the following aspects of the 2007 Presidential 
and Parliamentary elections: Impartiality of polling 
station staff  
 (1= Very dissatisfied; 2= 
Somewhat dissatisfied; 3= 
Somewhat satisfied; 4= Very 
satisfied). 
Impartiality in Counting 
and Tabulation Q34H_R 
Impartiality in the counting, tabulation and 
announcement of results 
INEC Neutrality Q20_R First of all, thinking about the performance of the 
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), 
with which of the following statements do you agree 
more: The Independent National Electoral 
Commission (INEC) performs its duty as a neutral 
body guided in its work only by the law, OR INEC 
makes decisions which favor particular people or 
interests? 
(1= INEC performs its duty as 
neutral body guided in its work 
only by the law; 2= INEC makes 
decisions which favor particular 
people or interests).  
 
Autonomy Index  Weighted average of the 3 items rescaled from 0-1 
(Chronbach’s alpha: 0.752) 




Partisanship Q19_R: Can you tell me which political party best 
represents aspirations of people like you? 
(2= support PDP; 1= Neutral; 0= 
support opposition) 
Fear of intimidation/ 
Experience with 
intimidation  
Q44A_R: On or before the presidential and 
parliamentary elections, did anyone try to pressure 
YOU to vote for a certain candidate in the election? 
Yes= 1; No=2 
Freedom to vote ** Not asked   
Ballot Secrecy Q39_R: Even though the vote is secret, do you believe 
that someone can find out how a person voted in these 
recent parliamentary and Presidential elections 
1=Yes, 2= No, 3=Maybe 
Vote buying Experience Q43_R: On or before the presidential and 
parliamentary elections, did anyone try to pressure 
YOU to vote for a certain candidate in the election?  
1= No; 0=Yes 
Violence Experience Q50_R: Did you see or hear of any violence related to 
the Presidential or Parliamentary elections 
0= Saw violence;1= Heard 
violence; 2=No experience w/ 
violence 
Voted in last election Q56_R: Did you vote in the April Presidential 
Elections or Not 
1=voted in elections; 0= Did not 
vote 
Registered to Vote Q52A_R: Were you registered to vote in the most 
recent elections? 
0=Did not Register; 1=Register 
Political Interest Please tell me how interested you are in matters of 
politics and government Q1_R 
 
(0= Not at all interested; 1=Not too 
interested; 2=Somewhat interested; 
3=Very interested). 
 
Interest in Elections Q29_R: Would you describe your interest in the 
recent presidential elections as high medium or low 
 
Info Exposure Q4ACsum: Please tell me how often you … Watch 
television for news on politics and government--- 
every day, a few times a week, a few times a month, 
once a month or less OR never? (0= Never; 2= Once a 
month or less; 3=A few times a week; 4=A few times 
a month) Radio, TV, Newspapers. 






General Q3_R: Could you tell me if you are very satisfied, 
somewhat satisfied, not too satisfied or not satisfied at 
the overall situation in Nigeria today 
(4=0 "Very dissatisfied") (3=1 
"Somewhat dissatisfied") (2=2 
"somewhat satisfied") (1=3 "Very 
satisfied") 
Social Structure   
D2_R Age of respondent 18-101 
D1_R Female Respondent 0=Male; 1=Female 
D9_R Level of education 0 No formal schooling; 9 Post-
graduate 
Geo-political Zones ZONES_NC ZONES_NE ZONES_NW ZONES_SS 
ZONES_SE ZONES_SW 
1 "NC" 2 "NE" 3 "NW" 4 "SE" 5 
"SS" 6 "SW" 634 "FCT" 





Appendix D: 2007 Nigerian Election Tribunal 







Number of Members 
House of 
Representatives 
Number of Electoral 
Tribunal Petitions 
Weighted by Number 
of House of 
Representative 
Members 
Mean Perceptions of 
Election Quality 
(Afrobarometer 
Round 4 Nigeria) 
Abia 53 8 6.6 0.60 
Adamawa 19 8 2.4 0.87 
Akwa-Ibom 11 10 1.1 1.23 
Anambra 148 11 13.5 0.46 
Bauchi 25 12 2.1 1.51 
Bayelsa 29 5 5.8 1.23 
Benue 30 11 2.7 1.18 
Borno 8 10 0.8 0.99 
Cross River 19 8 2.4 0.73 
Delta 54 10 5.4 0.91 
Ebonyi 17 6 2.8 1.09 
Edo 32 11 2.9 0.77 
Ekiti 32 6 5.3 1.19 
Enugu 67 8 8.4 0.60 
FCT 6 2 3.0 0.44 
Gombe 12 6 2.0 1.13 
Imo 48 10 4.8 0.35 
Jigawa 5 11 0.5 0.75 
Kaduna 21 15 1.4 1.51 
Kano 43 24 1.8 1.56 
Katsina 44 14 3.1 1.28 
Kebbi 27 8 3.4 1.13 
Kogi 46 9 5.1 0.96 
Kwara 21 6 3.5 1.75 
Lagos 12 24 0.5 1.07 
Nasarawa 24 5 4.8 0.75 
Niger 48 10 4.8 1.23 
Ogun 54 9 6.0 0.85 
Ondo 64 9 7.1 1.14 
Osun 38 9 4.2 0.33 
Oyo 40 15 2.7 0.46 
Plateau 28 7 4.0 1.26 
Rivers 68 13 5.2 0.50 
Sokoto 20 11 1.8 1.44 
Taraba 22 6 3.7 1.71 
Yobe 6 6 1.0 1.31 
Zamfara 24 7 3.4 1.24 
Mean 34.19 9.7  1.01 
Note: 
1 
Number of Election Tribunal petitions filed by candidates and political parties in the State (State 
Assembly and Governorship) and Federal (House of Representatives and Senate) elections for each state. 
 
